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actions, cautious courts may be justified in limiting Occidental Life to its
own facts and relying on it only in Title VII suits. 15 The interpretive
dilemma facing courts after the decision in Occidental Life could
probably have been avoided if the Supreme Court had chosen to reexamine
the borrowing rule and to formulate a new standard which would take
national policies into account in determining if a state limitations period
should be applied.
Steven D. McLamb

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

-

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT STATUTE
THE RIGHT TO INHERIT BY INTESTATE
SUCCESSION FROM THEIR FATHERS HELD TO BE INVIDIOUS
DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
DENYING

ILLEGITIMATES

Trimble v. Gordon (U.S. 1977)
Shortly after Sherman Gordon died intestate, appellant Deta Mona
Trimble, the illegitimate' daughter of appellant Jessie Trimble and Sherman
Gordon, was excluded from an order determining heirship entered by the
Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. 2 Prior to
Gordon's death in 1974, the Illinois circuit court had found him to be the
father of Deta Mona. 3 In reaching the decision to exclude Deta Mona from
85. The only Supreme Court decision in which a federal statute was ruled not
subject to a state statute of limitations involved a suit in equity to enforce a liability
created by the Federal Farm Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 812 (1970). Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392 (1946). The Holmberg Court declined to apply the state statute of
limitations on the ground that historic principles of equity mandated that the suit be
limited only by laches. Id. at 395. The Court probably would have subjected an action
at law brought under the same statute to the state statute of limitations, under the
theory of congressional acquiescence to the application of state limitations periods. Id.
at 395. For a discussion of this theory as a justification for the borrowing rule, see text
accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
1. According to one commentator:
The definition of illegitimacy is tied to the parents' marital status at the time
of their child's birth. It usually involves the fact that the child was "born out of
wedlock and not legitimated," sometimes includes a reference to the time of
conception to cover the child who was conceived before marriage or born after its
termination, and excludes from legitimacy children born to a married mother in
circumstances in which the husband could not have been the father.
H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 10-11 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
2. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763-64 (1977). The order identified as
Gordon's only heirs his father, mother, brother, two sisters, and half-brother, all of
whom were appellees in the instant case. Id. at 764.
3. Id. After the adjudication of paternity, Gordon supported Deta Mona as
ordered by the court and "openly acknowledged her as his child." Id.
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the order, the circuit court relied upon section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act4
(section 12), which allows illegitimate children to inherit by intestate
succession only from their mothers.5 Illinois law does, however, permit
legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from both their
6
mothers and their fathers.
The decision of the circuit court was appealed directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court.7 Appellants argued that section 12 violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 8 by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy, sex, and race. 9 Appellants' contentions that
section 12 was unconstitutional on these grounds were made in an amicus
brief filed in two pending consolidated appeals presenting similar issues. 0
In In re Estate of Karas,11 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of section 12 against all challenges, "including those presented in appellants' amicus brief."' 12 On the authority of Karas, the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision in Trimble.13 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a statutory provision which
allows illegitimate children to inherit only from their mothers invidiously
discriminates on the basis of illegitimacy in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
In the first decades after the enactment of the fourteenth amendment,
the equal protection clause was so rarely invoked by the Supreme Court that
Justice Holmes, in 1927, described it as "the usual last resort of
constitutional arguments."' 14 The level of review employed by the Court
when it did utilize the equal protection clause was labeled the rational basis
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1961). The Probate Act, including § 12, was
repealed and replaced on January 1, 1976, by the Probate Act of 1975. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 3, §§ 1-1 to 663 (Supp. 1976- 77). The part of§ 12 relevant in Trimble was recodified
without significant change in § 2-2 of the Probate Act of 1975. Id. § 2-2.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1961). Section 12 provided in pertinent part:
An illegitimate child is heir of its mother and of any maternal ancestor, and
of any person from whom its mother might have inherited, if living; and the
lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by
descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. An illegitimate
child whose parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the
father's child shall be considered legitimate.
Id.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-1 (Supp. 1976-77). If Deta Mona had been a
legitimate child, she would have inherited her father's entire estate. Id. § 2-1(b).
7. 430 U.S. at 765.
8. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
9. In re Estate of Karas, 61 111. 2d 40, 46-47, 50, 329 N.E.2d 234, 237, 239 (1975).

See text accompanying notes 10-12 infra.
10. 61 Ill.2d at 44, 329 N.E.2d at 236.
11. 61 Ill. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975).

12. Id. at 46-56, 329 N.E.2d at 237-42.
13. 430 U.S. at 765. The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court was delivered orally

by Chief Justice Underwood. Id.
14. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). See Note, Illegitimacy and Equal
Protection: Two Tiers or An Analytical Grab-Bag?, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 754, 756 (1976).
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standard.'5 Judicial review under this test was very limited, however, since
the Court showed great deference to legislative classifications. 16 A stricter
standard of review 17 did evolve, although its application was limited to cases
involving racials or other "suspect" legislative classifications. 19 By the late
1960's, the Warren Court had fashioned these standards into a "rigid twotier" approach to equal protection.2° In certain contexts, the traditional
15. There have been numerous formulations of the rational basis test. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (classifications must not be "patently arbitrary" or "utterly
lacking in rational justification"); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1955); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947); Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (classifications must "be reasonable,
not arbitrary," and they must be based upon distinctions which have a "fair and
substantial relation" to the purposes of the legislation); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (a classification does not violate the equal
protection clause simply because it is not mathematically precise or because it in fact
produces "some inequality", as long as it has some rational basis); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897). In McGowan, the Court articulated the test as
follows:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite
the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.
366 U.S. at 425-26 (citations omitted).
16. See Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in Constitutional Adjudication:
Toward the End of IrresponsibleJudicial Review and the Establishmentof a Viable
Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 164 (1975); Note,
The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 996 (1974). For a further
discussion of the traditional equal protection approach, see generally Developments in
the Law - Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Developments in the Law].
17. "Suspect" classifications, such as race, are subjected to what is known as
strict or rigid equal protection scrutiny, under which they bear a much heavier burden
of justification than that required under the traditional scrutiny. See Developments in
the Law, supra note 16, at 1088. Specifically, strict scrutiny differs from the rational
basis standard in a number of significant respects: 1) the usual presumption of
constitutionality is reversed when strict scrutiny is applied; 2) the state, rather than
the challenging party, must bear the burden of proof; 3) a possible rational basis for
the classification will be insufficient to satisfy the test of strict scrutiny; 4) sometimes
the classification must be deemed "necessary" to the accomplishment of a permissible
state purpose; and 5) the state's purpose must be considered to be "compelling." See id.
at 1101; Note, supra note 16, at 997. See also note 15 supra.
18. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (Florida criminal statute
prohibiting unmarried interracial couples from habitually occupying the same room
at night held to violate the equal protection clause); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools held a violation of the
equal protection guarantee inherent in the due process clause of the fifth amendment).
19. Other classifications have been designated as "suspect" by the Court and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(alienage); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin). A plurality of the Court has
designated classifications based on sex as suspect. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion).
20. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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rational basis test was applied, 21 while suspect classifications and
classifications adversely affecting "fundamental interests" 22 triggered strict
scrutiny 3 The Burger Court, without rejecting it entirely, has indicated its
dissatisfaction with this rigid, bifurcated approach. 24 As a result, a blurring
of the two tiers 25 has become apparent in the Court's decisions involving
26
equal protection for illegitimate children.
Prior to 1968, the equal protection clause had never been invoked for the
purpose of protecting the rights of illegitimates. 27 In that year, the Supreme
Court decided the companion cases of Levy v. Louisiana2 8 and Glona v.

21. Id. Specifically, it was in fiscal and regulatory matters that the Court
continued to apply the deferential rational basis test. See Developments in the Law,
supra note 16, at 1087. See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 366 U.S. 106
(1949).
22. For examples of interests determined to be fundamental by the Warren Court,
see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (criminal appeals once provided for by the state). See Gunther, supra note 20, at
8-9.
23. Gunther, supra note 20, at 8.
24. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972). In Mosley, there was a notable
absence of two-tier rhetoric. Instead, the Court observed that the question in all equal
protection cases is "whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably
furthered by the differential treatment." 408 U.S. at 95 (citations omitted). In Weber,
the Court paid lip-service to the two-tier approach, but then formulated a two-pronged
test to be applied in all equal protection cases. 406 U.S. at 172-73. See note 40 infra.
See also Gunther, supra note 20, at 10-20.
25. One commentator has suggested that the Court has blurred the sharp line
between traditional and strict scrutiny by giving "bite" to the rational basis test. See
Gunther, supra note 20, at 18-19. See also note 26 and accompanying text infra.
Whereas application of that test once meant virtual abdication of judicial review,
under the more recent formulations of the standard, "[]udicial deference to a broad
range of conceivable legislative purposes and to imaginable facts that might justify
classifications is strikingly diminished." Gunther, supra note 20, at 20. See text
accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
26. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See also notes 39, 40 & 42-46 and accompanying text
infra. The blurring of the two tiers was not as apparent in the earliest cases involving
equal protection for illegitimates, decided by the Warren Court. See Glona v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (Louisiana wrongful death statute
construed to bar recovery to parent of illegitimate child while allowing recovery to
parents of legitimate child violated the equal protection clause because there was no
rational basis for the distinction); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate children suing for wrongful death of mother
constituted denial of equal protection since legitimacy of birth has no relation to
wrong allegedly inflicted on mother). See also note 32 and accompanying text infra.
27. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 483
(1967); Note, supra note 14, at 755. Although English common law treated the
illegitimate very harshly, this harshness has been mitigated to a great extent in the
United States over the past century. See 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 392, 394-96 (1971).
Nevertheless, illegitimates have faced discrimination in this country under statutes
regulating rights to support, inheritance, benefit distributions, and public housing, as
well as under laws dealing with custody, visitation, and use of names. See Gray &
Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate:Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19-38 (1969).
28. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss2/8

4

Hunter: Constitutional Law - Fourteenth Amendment - Statute Denying Illeg

1977-1978]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.29 In Levy, the Court held
that a Louisiana statute that denied illegitimate children the right to bring a
wrongful death action for the death of their mother, while granting that
right to legitimate children, invidiously discriminated against illegitimates
in violation of the equal protection clause.3 In Glona, the Court invalidated
that part of the Louisiana wrongful death statute which provided that a
mother had no cause of action for the death of her illegitimate child. 3' In
both cases, the Court stated that the appropriate standard for testing
32
classifications based on illegitimacy was the rational basis test.
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Labine v. Vincent.33 In
Labine, the Court upheld a Louisiana law barring illegitimate children from
sharing equally with legitimate children in the estates of their fathers who
died intestate.34 In reaching its decision, the Court suggested that it was not
applying the rational basis test.35 Although the standard actually employed
was not articulated in the Labine opinion itself, the Court explained the
Labine holding, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,36 as resting on
two grounds: "the traditional deference to a State's perogative to regulate
the disposition at death of property within its borders;" 37 and the absence of
any insurmountable barriers to inheritance by illegitimates from their
fathers.38
29. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). For discussions of the implications of Levy and Glona, see,
e.g., Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 27; Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring
of Levy v. Louisiana- FirstDecisions on Equal Protectionand Paternity,36 U. CH.
L. REV. 338 (1969); Krause, The Bastard Finds His Father,3 FAM. L.Q. 100 (1969).
30. 391 U.S. at 71-72.
31. 391 U.S. at 76.
32. Specifically, the Levy Court noted: "[t]hough the test has been variously
stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is a rational one." 391 U.S. at 71
(citation omitted). See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75
(1968). However, after setting forth this test, the Court in Levy declined to consider
whether the line drawn was rational, but instead appeared to decide the case on the
ground that the rights asserted involved the "intimate familial relationship" between
a mother and her dependent children whose illegitimate status was in no way
relevant to the wrong done to the mother. 391 U.S. at 71-72. In Glona, however, the
Court actually did apply the test and concluded that there was no possible rational
relation between the classification and the permissible state purpose of discouraging
illegitimacy. 391 U.S. at 75. The Court determined that it was unreasonable to assume
that if natural mothers could recover for the wrongful death of their illegitimate
children, they would be encouraged to have children out of wedlock. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Black and
Stewart, called these decisions "constitutional curiosities." Id. at 76, (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan asserted that the legislative distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate children was rationally related to the legitimate state interest in
formalized family relationships, and thus would have allowed the Louisiana statute to
stand. Id. at 80-82. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
34. Id. at 535, 539-40.
35. This suggestion was indicated by the Court's statement: "Even if we were to
apply the 'rational basis' test to the Louisiana intestate succession statute, that
statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's interest in promoting family
life and of directing the disposition of property left within the State." Id. at 536 n.6.
36. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
37. Id. at 170, citing Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
38. 406 U.S. at 170-71. In Labine, the Court had emphasized that in Louisiana an
illegitimate child could inherit from his father on the same terms as a legitimate child
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In Weber, the Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Louisiana
workmen's compensation law that prevented dependent, unacknowledged
illegitimate children from recovering on an equal basis with legitimate
children for the death of their natural fathers. 39 The Weber Court closely
examined the question of whether the illegitimacy classification promoted
the state's interests.40 However, in two of the three cases following Weber in
which the Court invalidated legislative classifications based on illegitimacy,
the Court declined to engage in the same kind of in-depth analysis.' The
exception among these cases was Jiminez v. Weinberger.42 In Jimenez,

certain provisions of the Social Security Act were held to be unconstitutional
violations of the equal protection clause. 43 The challenged legislation
provided that legitimate children were entitled to a parent's disability
benefits without any showing of dependency, 44 while certain classes of
illegitimate children who were not dependent on the parent at the onset of
the disability were conclusively denied the benefits regardless of their
dependency at the time the application for benefits was made. 45 In its
if his father had executed a will, legitimated the child by marrying his mother, or
stated his desire to legitimate the child through an acknowledgement of paternity. 401
U.S. at 539.
In Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975), the Seventh Circuit in
discussing the insurmountable barrier rationale in illegitimacy cases observed: "We
have some difficulty in evaluating the importance of the options open to the parents,
since from the point of view of the child it really makes no difference whether options
were nonexistent or simply not exercised." Id. at 15.
39. 406 U.S. at 165.
40. Id. at 173-75. The Court suggested that the applicable test in this type of case
was a dual one involving a determination of the legitimate state interest promoted by

the classification, and an examination of the fundamental personal rights possibly
endangered by the classification. Id. at 173. The basis for the Court's holding,

however, appeared to be that the classification bore "no significant relationship to
those recognized purposes of recovery which workmen's compensation statutes
commendably serve." Id. at 175.
41. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam). But see Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628 (1974). In Gomez, a Texas law which granted legitimate children a judicially
enforceable right to support from their natural fathers while denying that right to
illegitimate children was held unconstitutional. 409 U.S. at 538. The Gomez Court did
not specify what equal protection standard it applied, although the Court did cite
Levy and Weber as support for its holding. Id. at 537-38 (citations omitted). The Court
noted that the state had a legitimate concern with problems of proof of paternity, but
instead of determining whether this interest was rationally related to the classification, the Court simply concluded that such problems cannot "be made into an
impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." Id. at
538 (citations omitted).
In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization,a New Jersey welfare assistance
program, which in effect denied benefits to most illegitimate children, was found to
violate the equal protection clause. 411 U.S. at 621. The Court reasoned that the
decisions in Levy, Weber, and Gomez compelled this conclusion since illegitimate
children had as great a need for the benefits of the program as legitimate children. Id.
at 620-21. Again, the Court did not consider whether the classification furthered the
asserted purposes of the statute.
42. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
43. Id. at 637.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970).
45. Id. § 416(h)(3).
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analysis, the Jimenez Court was particularly stringent in scrutinizing the

46
relationship between the classification and its asserted objectives.
Subsequently, the Court in Mathews v. Lucas47 upheld the constitutionality of certain other provisions of the Social Security Act 48 that were
challenged as denying equal protection to illegitimates. 49 These provisions
"conditioned the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for a surviving
child's insurance benefits upon a showing that the deceased wage earner
was the claimant child's parent and, at the time of his death, was living
with the child or contributing to his support."0 In contrast, legitimate
children and certain other classes of illegitimate children enjoyed a
statutory presumption of dependency.51 The Court found that the statute did
"not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without
more," but was rather "carefully tuned to alternative considerations."5 2 The
Court's detailed review of the relationship between the statutory classification and its asserted purposes suggests that the traditional version of the
rational basis standard was not being applied. 3 The opinion was, however,
marked by a deferential tone.5 4 In addition, the Mathews Court made it clear
that illegitimacy would not be considered a suspect classification requiring
55
strict scrutiny.

46. 417 U.S. at 633-37. The Court apparently considered it necessary to be
extremely precise in identifying the statutory objective. Id. at 633-34. After a careful
examination of the social security provision in question, id. at 634-35, the Court
rejected the statutory interpretation proposed by the government because it conflicted
with what the Court determined to be the underlying purpose of that scheme: "to
provide support for dependents of a disabled wage earner," regardless of whether that
support was "enjoyed prior to the onset of disability." Id. at 634. In analyzing whether
the statutory scheme furthered this purpose, the Court was careful to note that the
statute not only distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate children, but also
between two subclasses of illegitimate children. Id. at 635. It was this subclassification that was found to be irrational. Id. at 637. The Court, refusing to hypothesize
facts that might justify the subclassification, noted:
[F]or all that is shown in this record, the two subclasses of illegitimates stand on
equal footing, and the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence
to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other
denies the former the equal protection of the laws ....
Id. The Court did not consider this to be strict scrutiny, however, and, indeed, did not
even reach the argument that illegitimacy is a suspect classification and thus one
which would consistently be subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 631.
47. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
48. Id. at 516 (construing 42 U.S.C. §§402(d)(1), (3), 416(e), 416(h)(1)(B),
416(h)(2)(A), (B), 416(h)(3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)).
49. 427 U.S. at 502.
50. Id. at 497.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970). See 427 U.S. at 498-99.
52. 427 U.S. at 513.
53. Id. at 510-16.
54. Id. at 516. This was evidenced by the Court's statement: "In the end, the
precise accuracy of Congress' calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial
competence; and we have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident
consistency and substantiality." Id. at 516.
55. Id. at 504. The Court recognized that illegitimacy is akin to other suspect
classifications such as race or national origin in that it is "a characteristic determined
by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation
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The Trimble Court majority opinion began with a brief review of the
range of equal protection standards that might be applied to classifications
based on illegitimacy. 6 The principal standards were identified as the
minimum rationality standard, 57 "stricter" scrutiny," and "strictest" or
"most exacting" scrutiny.5 9 The Court concluded that "'less than strictest
scrutiny'" was the applicable test in the instant case and noted that this
standard was "'not a toothless one.'"60
Applying this test, the Court first examined the relationship between the
statutory classification and the purported state interests.6 1 The Court
determined that section 12 failed to promote the state's interest in
encouraging legitimate family relationships since "'penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual - as well as unjust - way of deterring the
parent.'"62 The majority criticized the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Karas for failing to make more than a cursory examination of the
relationship between the statute and this state purpose. 6 The Court also
made the same criticism of its own opinion in Labine, on which the Illinois
64
Supreme Court had relied.
to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society." Id. at 505.
However, the majority expressed the view that its refusal to give illegitimacy suspect
status was warranted. Id. at 505-06. The court explained:
[P]erhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of
the parents rather than the child, and perhaps in part because illegitimacy does
not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, . . . discrimination against
illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic
legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes.
Id. at 506 (footnote omitted).
56. 430 U.S. at 766-67. The argument made in appellants' amicus brief in Karas
that § 12 discriminates on the basis of race was not advanced in Trimble and therefore
was not considered by the Court. Id. at 765 n.10.
57. Id. at 766-67. The Court explained that under this standard the minimum
requirement is "'that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.'" Id:,quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
172 (1972).
58. 430 U.S. at 767. This level of scrutiny was said to be appropriate where
"'statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights.
Id., quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
59. 430 U.S. at 767. The Court was referring to the "strict" scrutiny applied to
suspect classifications. Id. (citation omitted). See note 17 supra.
60. 430 U.S. at 767, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 510. The view
expressed in Lucas that illegitimacy classifications are not suspect was reaffirmed in
Trimble. 430 U.S. at 767 (citations omitted).
61. 430 U.S. at 767-73. The purported state interests were in promoting legitimate
family relationships, and in establishing an efficient method for the distribution of
property at death. Id.
62. Id. at-769-70, quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
63. 430 U.S. at 768-69.
64. Id. The Louisiana intestate succession statute upheld in Labine was almost
'identical to the Illinois statute contested in Trimble. See text accompanying notes 4-6
& 34 supra. The Labine Court indicated that the Louisiana statute would promote the
state's interest in encouraging legitimate family relationships. 401 U.S. at 538. See
note 35 supra. The Trimble Court attempted to explain the inconsistency between its
conclusions in Labine and Trimble as to the relationships between the statutes and
this state interest. 430 U.S. at 768-69. The majority initially distinguished the
Louisiana law from § 12, but ultimately concluded that the Louisiana law may have
been "misguided" in its "attempt to deter illegitimate relationships." Id. at 768-69
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The state's interest in an accurate method of property disposition was
also found not to justify section 12.61 Although the Karas court had relied on
Labine for this justification as well, 66 the majority viewed the state court's
analysis of the relation between section 12 and the state's second major
objective as inadequate. 67 The Court acknowledged the state's need "to draw
'arbitrary lines . . . to facilitate potentially difficult problems of proof.' "68
The majority used a type of balancing test,69 however, and determined that
the state's legitimate concern with problems of proof could not be allowed
"'to shield otherwise invidious discrimination.' "70 Analyzing section 12 to
see whether it was "'carefully tuned to alternative considerations'," 71 and
not merely discriminatory without more, 72 the Court concluded that section
12 did not satisfy this standard since "[t]he reach of the statute extends well
73
beyond the asserted purposes."
n.13. In the text of the opinion, the Trimble Court reiterated this view, noting that in
the decisions which followed Labine it was determined that states could not "attempt
to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children
born of their illegitimate relationships." Id. at 769. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
65. 430 U.S. at 770-73.
66. 61 111. 2d at 48, 329 N.E.2d at 238 (citation omitted). The Illinois Supreme
Court, concerned with the difficulty of establishing paternity and the related risk of
spurious claims, held that the different treatment accorded intestate succession by
illegitimates from their mothers was justified on the theory that proof of maternity is
more easily obtained. Id. at 52-53, 329 N.E.2d at 240-41. According to one expert on
illegitimacy, this assumption is not an invalid one. H. KRAuSE, supra note 1, at 82.
The Trimble Court noted that Labine had been limited in its precedential force
by subsequent cases that had recognized that "judicial deference is appropriate" when
a statute challenged under the equal protection clause deals with the "'determination
of the valid ownership of property left by decedents .

. . .'"

430 U.S. at 767 n.12,

quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972). The Court reaffirmed
that position, but contended that "there is a point beyond which such deference
cannot justify discrimination." 430 U.S. at 767 n.12.
67. 430 U.S. at 770-71. According to the majority, this inadequacy was evidenced
by the fact that the statute unnecessarily included certain categories of illegitimate
children of intestate men whose inheritance rights could be recognized without
encountering any of the difficulties that the state purportedly hoped to avoid by
making the classification. Id.
68. Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 771. This balancing was illustrated by the Court's statement: "The
judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating constitutional rights without
interfering unduly with the State's primary responsibility in this area." Id.
70. Id., quoting Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
71. 430 U.S. at 772, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976). See text
accompanying note 52 supra.
72. 430 U.S. at 772.
73. Id. at 772-73. The Court focused on the facts of the instant case in supporting
this conclusion. Id. at 772. Gordon had been found, in a 1973 state court paternity suit,
to be Deta Mona's father. Id. See text accompanying note 3 supra. Proof of paternity
was therefore not an issue in her case and the fact that it might be a highly
problematic issue in other cases was not considered sufficient justification for the
blanket disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate. 430 U.S. at
772. The Court did recognize, however, that proof of paternity might be "unduly
burdensome" under certain circumstances and indicated that "[o]ur holding today
goes only to those forms of proof which do not compromise the States' interests." Id.
at 772 n.14.
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The Court next analyzed the Illinois court's reliance on the proposition,
established in Labine,7 4 that the absence of an insurmountable barrier
preventing an illegitimate child from inheriting part of her father's estate is
"constitutionally significant. ' 75 In rejecting this proposition, the majority
stated that a law which cannot pass constitutional muster under traditional
equal protection analysis is not rendered constitutionally acceptable by
virtue of the absence of insurmountable barriers under hypothetical
circumstances.16 The Court did note that it had scrutinized section 12 "more
77
critically than the Court examined the Louisiana statute in Labine."
Furthermore, the majority stated: "[T]o the extent that our analysis in this
case differs from that in Labine the more recent analysis controls." T
Finally, the Court dealt with the argument that section 12 should be
79
sustained because it mirrors the presumed intentions of Illinois citizens.
Finding that the desire to mirror citizens' intentions was not one of the
Illinois legislature's objectives in enacting the statute, s° the Court declined
to resolve the question of whether presumed intent could ever justify a
classification such as that made in section 12.1 The Court did, however,
express strong doubts as to whether a state could, "by invoking the theory of
'presumed intent,' "82 constitutionally place "the burden of inertia in writing
a will"8 3 on a disadvantaged group such as illegitimates.84

Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, 85 criticized the majority's
mode of equal protection review, arguing that it was not clear what level of
scrutiny had been applied8 6 The dissent was particularly critical of the
Court's analysis of the relationship between the state's purposes and the
74. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
75. 430 U.S. at 773. The Illinois court had noted that the decedents in Karas could

have left parts of their estates to their illegitimate children by drafting wills. 61 Ill.
2d
at 52, 329 N.E.2d at 240.

76. 430 U.S. at 774. The Court explained the significance placed on the presence
or absence of insurmountable barriers in Labine and in Weber as "somewhat of an
analytical anomaly." Id. at 773. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
170-71 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1972). See note 38 and

accompanying text supra.
77. 439 U.S. at 776 n.17.
78. Id.
79. 430 U.S. at 774-76.

80. Id. at 775-76. In making this determination, the Court relied on its own
examination of the purposes of § 12 and on the analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court,
which did not identify "presumed intent" as one of the interests served by the statute.
Id.

81. Id. at 774-75. The Court noted that characterizing the intestate succession
law as a "statutory will" based on the "presumed intent" of the state's citizens does
not camouflage the fact that it is state, not individual, action and thus subject to the
strictures of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 775 n.16.

82. Id. at 775 n.16.
83. Id.

84. Id. (citation omitted).

85. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Blackmun, also dissented.
They found the instant case to be "constitutionally indistinguishable from Labine,"
and therefore would have affirmed the judgment of the state court. Id. at 776-77
(citation omitted).
86. 430 U.S. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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classification chosen to accomplish them, noting that this is a legislative
task which the judiciary is not well-equipped to undertake.8 7 Considering the
proper standard of review to be the traditional formulation of the rational
basis test - that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonable may be conceived to justify it"8 - Justice
Rehnquist concluded that section 12 should have been sustained since the
distinction made therein was "not mindless and patently irrational."8 9
The majority opinion is subject to criticism for its ambiguous treatment
of Labine. It is submitted that the source of this ambiguity lies in the Court's
apparent reluctance to clearly identify the real factor which explains the
difference in the decisions in Labine and in the instant case - that since
Labine, the Court has given substantially more "bite" to the rational basis
test.90
The majority's analysis may also be criticized, as suggested by Justice
Rehnquist, for the confusion surrounding the equal protection standard
employed. 91 The majority labelled the appropriate test for illegitimacy
classifications "less than strictest scrutiny. ' ' 92 Unfortunately, this label
does not indicate precisely where, in the wide realm between minimum and
strictest scrutiny, this standard is anchored.93 Furthermore, the Court
accomplished little in the way of eliminating the confusion by describing the
standard as one which was "not toothless." 94
In actuality, it appears that the test applied by the Trimble Court is
remarkably close to strictest scrutiny,9 1 for it would be difficult to imagine a
more exacting analysis of the relationship between statutory purposes and
legislative means than the one engaged in by the majority. 9 As a result, it is
submitted that the once distinct tiers of equal protection analysis have been
blurred to such an extent that it is no longer helpful to think in terms of
distinct levels of scrutiny.
87. Id. at 783-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The grave defect in such an analysis,
according to Justice Rehnquist, is that it "requires a conscious second-guessing of
legislative judgment in an area where th[e] Court has no special expertise whatever."
Id. See notes 61-73 and accompanying text supra.
88. Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961) (Maryland statute prohibiting sale on Sundays of all merchandise,
with certain exceptions, held not to violate equal protection clause as it could not be
said that the statutory classifications were without rational relation to purposes of the
legislation).
89. 430 U.S. at 786 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. See Gunther, supra note 20, at 18-20. A comparison of Levy, the first case in
which the Supreme Court invalidated an illegitimacy classification on equal
protection grounds, with Jimenez, decided six years later, reveals a striking difference
in the depth of the equal protection analysis employed in the two cases. See notes 32 &
42-44 and accompanying text supra. See also text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
91. 430 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 86
supra.
92. 430 U.S. at 767, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). See note
60 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 17 supra.
94. 430 U.S. at 767.
95. See note 17 supra.
96. See notes 61-73 and accompanying text supra.
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It is conceivable that this development might prompt the Court to alter
its approach to equal protection analysis. In 1947, Justice Black noted that
"the constitutional command for a state to afford 'equal protection of the
laws' sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise
formula. This Court has never attempted that impossible task.197 Despite
this observation, it is believed that a "reasoned articulation" of the new
trends in equal protection analysis is possible. 98
Scholars and members of the Court have suggested several different
approaches that the Court might take to determine whether illegitimacy
classifications violate the equal protection clause. It has been proposed, for
instance, that illegitimacy be made a suspect classification like race and
ancestry. 99 It is submitted, however, that this approach would not be
appropriate since the Court would remain locked into the two-tiered
framework that has become a source of confusion. 100 Balancing tests have
been suggested as an alternative.101
The most viable approach in this area may be the "multifactor, sliding
scale analysis"'0 2 suggested by Justice Marshall. 10 3 Justice Marshall has
contended that the Court "has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause."'' 0 4 The
degree of scrutiny has varied with "the constitutional and societal
importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn."' 0 5 In
Justice Marshall's view, once the appropriate degree of scrutiny has been

97. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
98. See Gunther, supra note 20, at 20. See also Note, supra note 14, at 780-81.
99. See Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 27, at 15; Note, supra note 14, at 773-75;
Note, Constitutional Law - Due Process and Equal Protection - Classifications
Based on Illegitimacy, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 908, 913-14. It is usually argued that
illegitimacy is so akin to other suspect classifications that there is no reason not to
give it suspect status. See Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 27, at 5-7; Note, supra note
14, at 774-75; Note, supra at 913. The Supreme Court has recognized this argument
but is apparently reluctant to expand the number of classifications deemed suspect.
See notes 55 & 60 and accompanying text supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 86 & 91-94 supra.
101. See Shaman, supra note 16, at 174; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945,
989-98 (1975); Note, supra note 16, at 1022-23.
Under the balancing approach, the Court would first balance the individual
interests involved in the classification against the asserted state purpose. Shaman,
supra note 16, at 174. If the Court determined that the valid state purpose outweighed
the individual rights, it would then consider whether that purpose and the
classification were reasonably related. Id.
102. This term was coined by Professor Gunther. Gunther, supra note 20, at 17-18.
.103. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-109
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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determined by reference to the character of the particular classification, the
Court has concentrated upon "the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not
106
receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification."
Furthermore, Justice Marshall has suggested that use of this approach has
been particularly evident in the Court's decisions involving equal protection
for illegitimate children. 07 It is submitted that if this is the approach which
the Court is actually taking, the Court must, if it is to be rational and
consistent in its decisionmaking, acknowledge this fact rather than attempt
to adhere to the unworkable two-tiered analysis framework.108
Since the Court indicated that the Trimble holding "goes only to those
forms of proof which do not compromise the State's interests,"'1 9 it appears
that a state intestate succession statute could be framed which, without
violating the equal protection clause, would deny some illegitimate children

106. Id. Quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The problem with the two-tier approach to equal protection is that it can
deal adequately with the extremes but seems to falter in those cases that fall in
between. See Note, supra note 14, at 758. Thus, application of the deferential rational
basis test to business regulations or the application of the strict scrutiny standard to
clearly invidious racial classifications, does not give rise to any difficulties. Compare
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (city traffic
regulation prohibiting operation of vehicles bearing advertisements, except vehicles
which advertised business or products of the owner and which were not used primarly
for advertising, held not to violate the equal protection clause as there was no basis
for finding that the ordinance was not related to the city's interest in eliminating
traffic distractions) with McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1964) (Florida
criminal statute prohibiting unmarried interracial couples from habitually occupying
the same room at night held to violate the equal protection clause as there was no
overriding statutory purpose justifying proscription of the specified conduct only
when engaged in by interracial couples). One commentator has noted that
[slimple deference tot he legislative will under the traditional rational basis test
can appear to offend common notions of justice where, for example, the right
threatened is a personal right which, while not protected by the Bill of Rights, is
vital to a decent standard of living; or where the classification, while not suspect
under judicial precedent, seems to possess the general attributes of a suspect
classification.
Note, supra note 14, at 758.
107. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 108-09
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Rodriguez, Justice Marshall commented that "the
Court's sensitivity to the invidiousness of the basis for discrimination is perhaps most
apparent in its decisions protecting the interests of children born out of wedlock from
discriminatory state action." Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Marshall asserted that these decisions supported his conclusion that "th[e]
Court has consistently adjusted the care with which it will review state discrimination
in light of the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the
invidiousness of the particular classification." Id. at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. See 411 U.S. at 109-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. 430 U.S. at 772 n.14. See note 73 supra.
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the right to inherit from their fathers. 110 It is submitted that alternative
subsection (2) of section 2-109 of the Uniform Probate Code"1 accomplishes
this result," 2 as the provision appears "carefully tailored to eliminate
3
imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing paternity.""1
While the impact of this decision on illegitimate children themselves
certainly should not be ignored," 4 it is submitted that the greatest
significance of Trimble lies in the implications for equal protection analysis
that this case contains.
Lisa S. Hunter

110. See 430 U.S. at 772 n.14. The Court indicated that a state statute that was
"carefully tailored to eliminate imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of
establishing paternity" would be constitutionally acceptable. Id.
111. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §2-109(2) (alternative subsection) (1975 version).
That section provides in pertinent part: "a person born out of wedlock is a child of the
mother. That person is also a child of the father if: . . . (ii) the paternity is established
by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established thereafter by clear
and convincing proof." Id.
112. See Note, 69 MICH. L. REV. 112, 117-18 (1970); Note, supra note 14, at 777
n.135. It has been suggested that this provision would be valid under either the
minimum rationality standard or the test of strict scrutiny. See Note, supra, at 117.
113. 430 U.S. at 772 n.14. See note 110 supra. One commentator has taken the
position that this provision of the Uniform Probate Code gives all children "the right

to inherit equally from their natural parents," and "merely establishes a burden of
proof of paternity in the child-father relationship which the illegitimate must meet
before he can inherit from his natural father." Note, supra note 112, at 117 (footnote
omitted). Furthermore, the "clear and convincing" standard set out in alternative

subsection (2) of § 2-109 has been noted as being "consistent with other burdens of

proof relating to legal relationships involving deceased persons," and thus probably
constitutional. Id. at 118 (footnote omitted).
114. Professor Krause has noted that allowing the illegitimate to inherit from his
father gives him access to an important "private resource" - his parent - "that
ought to be available to give him an even start in life." Krause, Bringing the Bastard
Into the Great Society - A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAs L. REV.
829, 829-30 (1966).
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